Trembling hand perfection is NP-hard
Peter Bro Miltersen
TL;DR
Deciding whether a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is trembling hand perfect in a three-player game with integer payoffs is computationally NP-hard, indicating significant complexity in equilibrium refinement verification.
Contribution
This paper proves that verifying trembling hand perfection for pure-strategy Nash equilibria in three-player games is NP-hard, highlighting computational challenges in equilibrium analysis.
Findings
NP-hardness of trembling hand perfection decision problem
Implications for computational game theory
Complexity results for equilibrium refinement verification
Abstract
It is NP-hard to decide if a given pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a given three-player game in strategic form with integer payoffs is trembling hand perfect.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems