Conversion/Preference Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces Conversion/Preference (CP) games, a generalized framework for strategic games, demonstrating their applications in gene regulation and security, and analyzing equilibrium existence in infinite cases.

Contribution

The paper formalizes CP games, extending strategic game theory, and explores their applications and equilibrium properties in complex, real-world scenarios.

Findings

CP games generalize standard strategic games

Application of CP games to gene regulation networks

Existence of equilibria in infinite CP games

Abstract

We introduce the concept of Conversion/Preference Games, or CP games for short. CP games generalize the standard notion of strategic games. First we exemplify the use of CP games. Second we formally introduce and define the CP-games formalism. Then we sketch two `real-life' applications, namely a connection between CP games and gene regulation networks, and the use of CP games to formalize implied information in Chinese Wall security. We end with a study of a particular fixed-point construction over CP games and of the resulting existence of equilibria in possibly infinite games.