The norm game - how a norm fails

TL;DR

This paper models how social norms can fail using a norm game on a network, revealing how punishment, its cost, and network structure influence norm stability and failure.

Contribution

It introduces a simulation of the norm game on directed networks, analyzing how punishment and network effects impact norm persistence and failure.

Findings

Threshold initial boldness determines norm failure

Punishment increases norm resilience, but with diminishing returns

Network structure influences the likelihood of norm collapse

Abstract

We discuss the simulations of the norm game between players at nodes of a directed random network. The final boldness of the players can vary with the initial one as the $\Theta$ function. One of the conditions of this behaviour is that the player who does not punish automatically becomes a defector. The threshold value of the initial boldness can be interpreted as a norm strength. It increases with the punishment and decreases with its cost. Surprisingly, it also decreases with the number of potential punishers. The numerical results are discussed in the context of the statistical data on crimes in Northern Ireland and New Zealand, on divorces in USA, and on the alcohol consumption in Poland.