Dynamic assignment: there is an equilibrium !
Fr\'ed\'eric Meunier, Nicolas Wagner

TL;DR
This paper proves that a Nash equilibrium always exists in a realistic dynamic assignment problem in networks, extending previous results that required restrictive assumptions.
Contribution
It introduces a compact, natural model for dynamic assignment and demonstrates the universal existence of equilibrium without technical restrictions.
Findings
Existence of equilibrium is proven for the proposed model.
The result generalizes previous existence proofs with more restrictive assumptions.
The model applies to various networks like transportation and communication.
Abstract
Given a network with a continuum of users at some origins, suppose that the users wish to reach specific destinations, but that they are not indifferent to the time needed to reach their destination. They may have several possibilities (of routes or deparure time), but their choices modify the travel times on the network. Hence, each user faces the following problem: given a pattern of travel times for the different possible routes that reach the destination, find a shortest path. The situation in a context of perfect information is a so-called Nash equilibrium, and the question whether there is such an equilibrium and of finding it if it exists is the so-called equilibrium assignment problem. It arises for various kind of networks, such as computers, communication or transportation network. When each user occupies permanently the whole route from the origin to its destination, we call…
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Taxonomy
TopicsTransportation Planning and Optimization · Transportation and Mobility Innovations · Game Theory and Voting Systems
