Stackelberg Contention Games in Multiuser Networks

TL;DR

This paper introduces a Stackelberg game approach to improve the stability and efficiency of multiuser networks sharing a transmission channel, addressing issues caused by selfish user behavior.

Contribution

It proposes a methodology to transform non-cooperative games into Stackelberg games, achieving better equilibria and network performance.

Findings

Stackelberg equilibria can outperform Nash equilibria in network stability.

Any feasible positive payoff profile can be achieved as a Stackelberg equilibrium.

Relaxing informational requirements impacts network performance.

Abstract

Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any coordination mechanism, Nash equilibria usually result in a network collapse. We propose a methodology that transforms the non-cooperative game into a Stackelberg game. Stackelberg equilibria of the Stackelberg game can overcome the deficiency of the Nash equilibria of the original game. A particular type of Stackelberg intervention is constructed to show that any positive payoff profile feasible with independent transmission probabilities can be achieved as a Stackelberg equilibrium payoff profile. We discuss criteria to select an operating point of the network and informational requirements for the Stackelberg game. We relax the requirements and examine the effects of relaxation on performance.