Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

TL;DR

This study demonstrates that the movement of influential players in a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game significantly enhances cooperation levels, even when these players are few, by leveraging their strategic influence.

Contribution

It introduces a model where influential players' mobility supports cooperation, highlighting the impact of player influence and movement on evolutionary game dynamics.

Findings

Influential players' motion promotes cooperation.

Low-density influential players can sustain cooperation.

Strategy adoption depends on payoff differences and player influence.

Abstract

We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategy therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.