Modelling interdependencies between the electricity and information infrastructures

TL;DR

This paper develops qualitative models to understand how failures in electricity and information infrastructures interdepend, especially cascading and common-cause failures, highlighting increased risks due to growing connectivity and potential attack scenarios.

Contribution

It introduces qualitative models that characterize interdependent failures between electricity and information infrastructures, emphasizing cascading and common-cause failure mechanisms.

Findings

Interdependencies increase failure risks in critical infrastructures.

Models address cascading, escalating, and common-cause failures.

Brief discussion on malicious attack impacts.

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide qualitative models characterizing interdependencies related failures of two critical infrastructures: the electricity infrastructure and the associated information infrastructure. The interdependencies of these two infrastructures are increasing due to a growing connection of the power grid networks to the global information infrastructure, as a consequence of market deregulation and opening. These interdependencies increase the risk of failures. We focus on cascading, escalating and common-cause failures, which correspond to the main causes of failures due to interdependencies. We address failures in the electricity infrastructure, in combination with accidental failures in the information infrastructure, then we show briefly how malicious attacks in the information infrastructure can be addressed.