Spectrum Sharing between Wireless Networks
Leonard Grokop, David N. C. Tse

TL;DR
This paper analyzes how two wireless networks sharing the same frequency band can reach different equilibrium behaviors based on environmental factors, revealing conditions under which they naturally cooperate or compete.
Contribution
It models spectrum sharing as a game, characterizes Nash equilibria, and identifies environmental conditions influencing cooperative or competitive regimes.
Findings
Three distinct spectrum sharing regimes identified
High pathloss environments promote cooperation
Simulations confirm analytical equilibrium predictions
Abstract
We consider the problem of two wireless networks operating on the same (presumably unlicensed) frequency band. Pairs within a given network cooperate to schedule transmissions, but between networks there is competition for spectrum. To make the problem tractable, we assume transmissions are scheduled according to a random access protocol where each network chooses an access probability for its users. A game between the two networks is defined. We characterize the Nash Equilibrium behavior of the system. Three regimes are identified; one in which both networks simultaneously schedule all transmissions; one in which the denser network schedules all transmissions and the sparser only schedules a fraction; and one in which both networks schedule only a fraction of their transmissions. The regime of operation depends on the pathloss exponent , the latter regime being desirable, but…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Wireless Network Optimization · Advanced Queuing Theory Analysis · Cognitive Radio Networks and Spectrum Sensing
