Thinking Twice about Second-Price Ad Auctions
Yossi Azar, Benjamin Birnbaum, Anna R. Karlin, and C. Thach Nguyen

TL;DR
This paper investigates the computational complexity of second-price ad auctions, revealing their NP-hardness and APX-hardness, and introduces approximation algorithms for the offline and online versions of the problem.
Contribution
It demonstrates the NP-hardness of approximating second-price ad auctions and provides the first known approximation algorithms for the offline and online cases.
Findings
Second-price ad auctions are NP-hard to approximate.
Offline 2PM admits a 2-approximation algorithm.
Online 2PM has a 5.083-competitive randomized algorithm.
Abstract
Recent work has addressed the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions so as to maximize revenue, most of which assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction. This does not realistically model the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used in practice, in which bidders pay the next-highest bid for keywords that they are allocated. Towards the goal of more realistically modeling these auctions, we introduce the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which bidders' payments are determined by the GSP mechanism. We show that the complexity of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is quite different than that of the more studied First-Price Ad Auctions problem. First, unlike the first-price variant, for which small constant-factor approximations are known, it is NP-hard to approximate the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem to any…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOptimization and Search Problems · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
