Derivation of evolutionary payoffs from observable behavior

TL;DR

This paper introduces a general method to derive evolutionary payoffs from observable animal behaviors, enabling better understanding of animal strategies in ecological interactions.

Contribution

The paper presents a novel approach to infer evolutionary payoffs directly from observable interaction data, bridging behavioral observations and game theoretical models.

Findings

Applied method to spider combat, predator inspection, and lion territorial defense

Demonstrated animal behaviors as equilibrium strategies in game theory

Highlighted limitations due to unobservable communication mechanisms

Abstract

Interpretation of animal behavior, especially as cooperative or selfish, is a challenge for evolutionary theory. Strategy of a competition should follow from corresponding Darwinian payoffs for the available behavioral options. The payoffs and decision making processes, however, are difficult to observe and quantify. Here we present a general method for the derivation of evolutionary payoffs from observable statistics of interactions. The method is applied to combat of male bowl and doily spiders, to predator inspection by sticklebacks and to territorial defense by lions, demonstrating animal behavior as a new type of game theoretical equilibrium. Games animals play may be derived unequivocally from their observable behavior, the reconstruction, however, can be subjected to fundamental limitations due to our inability to observe all information exchange mechanisms (communication).