Equilibrium policies when preferences are time inconsistent
Ivar Ekeland, Ali Lazrak

TL;DR
This paper analyzes equilibrium policies in continuous-time intertemporal decision problems with non-constant discounting, highlighting the existence of multiple equilibria and their implications for intergenerational welfare and policy design.
Contribution
It characterizes subgame Markov perfect equilibria with non-constant discounting and applies this to an overlapping generations model with time-inconsistent optimal policies.
Findings
Multiple equilibria exist due to belief coordination issues.
Time inconsistency arises when social and private discount rates differ.
Decentralized policies can be implemented via age/time-dependent transfers and taxes.
Abstract
This paper characterizes differentiable and subgame Markov perfect equilibria in a continuous time intertemporal decision problem with non-constant discounting. Capturing the idea of non commitment by letting the commitment period being infinitesimally small, we characterize the equilibrium strategies by a value function, which must satisfy a certain equation. The equilibrium equation is reminiscent of the classical Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of optimal control, but with a non-local term leading to differences in qualitative behavior. As an application, we formulate an overlapping generations Ramsey model where the government maximizes a utilitarian welfare function defined as the discounted sum of successive generations' lifetime utilities. When the social discount rate is different from the private discount rate, the optimal command allocation is time inconsistent and we retain…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
