Should the democrats move to the left on economic policy?
Andrew Gelman, Cexun Jeffrey Cai

TL;DR
This paper uses a theoretical model and survey data to analyze whether the Democratic Party should shift left on economic policy to maximize votes, considering multidimensional voter preferences and perceptions.
Contribution
It introduces a model showing Democrats can benefit from a slight rightward move on economic issues, contrary to simple median voter theory, based on voter perception data.
Findings
Democrats should move slightly to the right on economic policy.
Parties benefit from strategic positioning in multidimensional issue spaces.
Voter perceptions influence optimal party positioning.
Abstract
Could John Kerry have gained votes in the 2004 Presidential election by more clearly distinguishing himself from George Bush on economic policy? At first thought, the logic of political preferences would suggest not: the Republicans are to the right of most Americans on economic policy, and so in a one-dimensional space with party positions measured with no error, the optimal strategy for the Democrats would be to stand infinitesimally to the left of the Republicans. The median voter theorem suggests that each party should keep its policy positions just barely distinguishable from the opposition. In a multidimensional setting, however, or when voters vary in their perceptions of the parties' positions, a party can benefit from putting some daylight between itself and the other party on an issue where it has a public-opinion advantage (such as economic policy for the Democrats). We set…
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