Recover plaintext attack to block ciphers
An-Ping Li

TL;DR
This paper estimates the upper bound of 16-byte plaintexts for English texts, highlighting that block ciphers with block lengths up to 16 bytes are vulnerable to plaintext recovery attacks under known or chosen plaintext scenarios.
Contribution
It provides an estimation of the maximum number of plaintexts for English texts that can be recovered, emphasizing vulnerabilities in block ciphers with block sizes up to 16 bytes.
Findings
Upper-bound estimation for plaintexts in English texts
Vulnerability of block ciphers with block length ≤ 16 bytes
Implications for plaintext recovery attacks
Abstract
we will present an estimation for the upper-bound of the amount of 16-bytes plaintexts for English texts, which indicates that the block ciphers with block length no more than 16-bytes will be subject to recover plaintext attacks in the occasions of plaintext -known or plaintext-chosen attacks.
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptographic Implementations and Security · Coding theory and cryptography · Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption
