Coalition Games with Cooperative Transmission: A Cure for the Curse of Boundary Nodes in Selfish Packet-Forwarding Wireless Networks
Zhu Han, Vincent Poor

TL;DR
This paper introduces a coalition game approach with cooperative transmission to address the boundary node problem in selfish wireless networks, improving connectivity and fairness among nodes.
Contribution
It proposes a novel coalition game framework incorporating cooperative transmission and introduces market fairness, enhancing boundary node participation and network performance.
Findings
Boundary nodes can effectively cooperate with backbone nodes.
The protocol improves network connectivity by about 50%.
Different fairness criteria influence coalition formation.
Abstract
In wireless packet-forwarding networks with selfish nodes, application of a repeated game can induce the nodes to forward each others' packets, so that the network performance can be improved. However, the nodes on the boundary of such networks cannot benefit from this strategy, as the other nodes do not depend on them. This problem is sometimes known as {\em the curse of the boundary nodes}. To overcome this problem, an approach based on coalition games is proposed, in which the boundary nodes can use cooperative transmission to help the backbone nodes in the middle of the network. In return, the backbone nodes are willing to forward the boundary nodes' packets. Here, the concept of core is used to study the stability of the coalitions in such games. Then three types of fairness are investigated, namely, min-max fairness using nucleolus, average fairness using the Shapley function, and…
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