Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value - a new proof

TL;DR

This paper presents a new proof of Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value, demonstrating its applicability to various subclasses of TU games, thereby strengthening the theoretical foundation of cooperative game solutions.

Contribution

A novel proof of Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value, extending its validity to multiple subclasses of TU games.

Findings

The new proof confirms Young's axiomatization across different TU game subclasses.

The approach simplifies understanding of the axiomatization's scope.

The results reinforce the theoretical robustness of the Shapley value.

Abstract

We consider Young (1985)'s characterization of the Shapley value, and give a new proof of this axiomatization. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young (1985)'s axiomatization of the Shapley value works on various well-known subclasses of TU games.