A proof theoretic analysis of intruder theories
Alwen Tiu, Rajeev Gore

TL;DR
This paper presents a proof-theoretic approach to decide intruder deduction in security protocols involving complex equational theories, simplifying the process through sequent calculus and polynomial-time reductions.
Contribution
It introduces a systematic, uniform proof-theoretic method to reduce intruder deduction problems to elementary deduction, extending to combined theories.
Findings
Decidability of intruder deduction reduces to elementary deduction in polynomial time.
Sequent calculus provides immediate locality, simplifying proof search.
Results extend to disjoint AC-convergent theories.
Abstract
We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding whether a given message can be deduced from a set of messages under the theory of blind signatures and arbitrary convergent equational theories modulo associativity and commutativity (AC) of certain binary operators. The traditional formulations of intruder deduction are usually given in natural-deduction-like systems and proving decidability requires significant effort in showing that the rules are "local" in some sense. By using the well-known translation between natural deduction and sequent calculus, we recast the intruder deduction problem as proof search in sequent calculus, in which locality is immediate. Using standard proof theoretic methods, such as permutability of rules and cut elimination, we show that the intruder deduction problem can be reduced, in polynomial time,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComputability, Logic, AI Algorithms
