Auction-based Resource Allocation for Multi-relay Asynchronous Cooperative Networks
Jianwei Huang, Zhu Han, Mung Chiang, H. Vincent Poor

TL;DR
This paper introduces auction-based mechanisms for resource allocation in multi-relay cooperative wireless networks, enabling distributed, efficient, and fair power distribution among relays with proven equilibrium properties.
Contribution
It proposes SNR and power auction mechanisms for relay resource allocation, providing conditions for equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and asynchronous convergence.
Findings
SNR auction has a unique Nash equilibrium under certain conditions.
Power auction improves resource utilization by allowing multiple relay usage.
Distributed best response updates converge to equilibrium asynchronously.
Abstract
Resource allocation is considered for cooperative transmissions in multiple-relay wireless networks. Two auction mechanisms, SNR auctions and power auctions, are proposed to distributively coordinate the allocation of power among multiple relays. In the SNR auction, a user chooses the relay with the lowest weighted price. In the power auction, a user may choose to use multiple relays simultaneously, depending on the network topology and the relays' prices. Sufficient conditions for the existence (in both auctions) and uniqueness (in the SNR auction) of the Nash equilibrium are given. The fairness of the SNR auction and efficiency of the power auction are further discussed. It is also proven that users can achieve the unique Nash equilibrium distributively via best response updates in a completely asynchronous manner.
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