Effect of memory on the prisoner's dilemma game in a square lattice

TL;DR

This study investigates how memory influences cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on square lattices, revealing that memory generally promotes cooperation but can decrease it under certain conditions, with memory providing immunity from temptation.

Contribution

It demonstrates the complex role of memory in promoting or hindering cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma models, highlighting optimal memory levels for cooperation.

Findings

Memory enhances cooperator density for most parameters.

Large memory and moderate temptation reduce cooperation.

Memory provides immunity from temptation.

Abstract

We have studied the effect of memory on evolution of the prisoner's dilemma game using square lattice networks. Based on extensive simulations, we found that the density of cooperators was enhanced by an increasing memory effect for most parameters. However, we also observed that the density of cooperators decreased with an increased memory effect in the case of a large memory and moderate temptation. It is interesting to note that memory makes cooperators immune from temptation. The strength of protection reaches its maximal value only for the moderate memory effect.