Revisiting the security of quantum dialogue and bidirectional quantum secure direct communication
Fei Gao, Fen-Zhuo Guo, Qiao-Yan Wen, Fu-Chen Zhu

TL;DR
This paper critically examines the security of certain quantum communication protocols, revealing information leakage issues that challenge their assumed confidentiality and calling for further research to address these vulnerabilities.
Contribution
It identifies and analyzes security flaws in existing quantum dialogue and QSDC protocols, highlighting the need for improved security measures.
Findings
Information leakage in protocols
Eavesdropper can extract secret info
Existing protocols have security vulnerabilities
Abstract
From the perspective of information theory and cryptography, we analyze the security of two quantum dialogue protocols and a bidirectional quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol, and point out that the transmitted information would be partly leaked out in them. That is, any eavesdropper can elicit some information about the secrets from the public annunciations of the legal users. This phenomenon should have been strictly forbidden in a quantum secure communication. In fact, this problem exists in quite a few recent proposals and, therefore, it deserves more research attention in the following related study.
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