Quantum Cryptography Protocol Based on Sending Entangled Qubit Pairs

TL;DR

This paper proposes a modified quantum key distribution protocol based on sending entangled qubit groups with non-local transformations, significantly reducing eavesdropper's information compared to BB84.

Contribution

It introduces a novel entangled qubit group protocol with non-local transformations, enhancing security against eavesdropping over traditional BB84.

Findings

Eavesdropper's maximal information reduced to one eighth of BB84.

The protocol restricts eavesdropper's access to individual particles.

A new attack type against the protocol is discussed.

Abstract

The quantum key distribution protocol BB84, published by C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard in 1984, describes how two spatially separated parties can generate a random bit string fully known only to them by transmission of single-qubit quantum states. Any attempt to eavesdrop on the protocol introduces disturbance which can be detected by the legitimate parties. In this Master's Thesis a novel modification to the BB84 protocol is analyzed. Instead of sending single particles one-by-one as in BB84, they are grouped and a non-local transformation is applied to each group before transmission. Each particle is sent to the intended receiver, always delaying the transmission until the receiver has acknowledged the previous particle on an authenticated classical channel, restricting eavesdropping to accessing the quantum transmission one particle at a time. Hence, an eavesdropper cannot undo the non-local transformation perfectly. Even if perfect cloning of quantum states was possible the state of the group could not be cloned. We calculate the maximal information on the established key provided by an intercept-resend attack and the induced disturbance for different transformations. We observe that it is possible to significantly reduce the eavesdropper's maximal information on the key--to one eighth of that in BB84 for a fixed, reasonable amount of disturbance. We also show that the individual access to the particles poses a fundamental restriction to the eavesdropper, and discuss a novel attack type against the proposed protocol.