Cryptanalysis of an Image Encryption Scheme Based on a Compound Chaotic Sequence
Chengqing Li, Shujun Li, Guanrong Chen, Wolfgang A. Halang

TL;DR
This paper critically analyzes a recent image encryption scheme based on compound chaotic sequences, revealing vulnerabilities such as susceptibility to differential attacks, weak keys, and poor randomness, thereby questioning its security effectiveness.
Contribution
The paper provides a detailed cryptanalysis of the scheme, identifying specific security flaws and demonstrating its weaknesses against various attack methods.
Findings
Differential chosen-plaintext attack can break the scheme with three images
Existence of weak and equivalent keys reduces security
The scheme lacks sensitivity to plaintext changes
Abstract
Recently, an image encryption scheme based on a compound chaotic sequence was proposed. In this paper, the security of the scheme is studied and the following problems are found: (1) a differential chosen-plaintext attack can break the scheme with only three chosen plain-images; (2) there is a number of weak keys and some equivalent keys for encryption; (3) the scheme is not sensitive to the changes of plain-images; and (4) the compound chaotic sequence does not work as a good random number resource.
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