The prisoners dilemma on a stochastic non-growth network evolution model

TL;DR

This paper studies how cooperation evolves in a dynamic network where nodes reproduce based on game payoffs, analyzing the effects of fluctuations and strategy mutations on cooperation levels.

Contribution

It introduces a non-growth network model with death/birth dynamics and explores its mean field properties and size-dependent behavior in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Findings

Mean field characteristics of the model analyzed

Size-dependent fluctuations in strategy densities observed

Role of strategy mutation in regulating cooperation discussed

Abstract

We investigate the evolution of cooperation on a non - growth network model with death/birth dynamics. Nodes reproduce under selection for higher payoffs in a prisoners dilemma game played between network neighbours. The mean field characteristics of the model are explored and an attempt is made to understand the size dependent behaviour of the model in terms of fluctuations in the strategy densities. We also briefly comment on the role of strategy mutation in regulating the strategy densties.