Finite size effects and symmetry breaking in the evolution of networks of competing Boolean nodes
Min Liu, Kevin E. Bassler

TL;DR
This paper investigates how finite size influences the evolution of Boolean networks, revealing symmetry breaking and additional selection pressures that differ from infinite networks, with implications for real-world complex systems.
Contribution
It demonstrates that finite size networks exhibit different evolutionary dynamics and symmetry breaking, introducing new selection for input-inverting functions not present in infinite networks.
Findings
Finite size networks evolve differently than infinite ones.
Symmetry breaking leads to selection of input-inverting functions.
Empirical results match analytic predictions using Polya's theorem.
Abstract
The effects of the finite size of the network on the evolutionary dynamics of a Boolean network are analyzed. In the model considered, Boolean networks evolve via a competition between nodes that punishes those in the majority. It is found that finite size networks evolve in a fundamentally different way than infinitely large networks do. The symmetry of the evolutionary dynamics of infinitely large networks that selects for canalizing Boolean functions is broken in the evolutionary dynamics of finite size networks. In finite size networks there is an additional selection for input inverting Boolean functions that output a value opposite to the majority of input values. These results are revealed through an empirical study of the model that calculates the frequency of occurrence of the different possible Boolean functions. Classes of functions are found to occur with the same frequency.…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGene Regulatory Network Analysis · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
