Multiply Connected Topological Economics, Confidence Relation and Political Economy
Yi-Fang Chang

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel topological framework for political economy, incorporating confidence relations and influence functions to model complex interactions, power dynamics, and systemic anomalies like wormholes and corruption.
Contribution
It proposes the concept of multiply connected topological economics and the influence of confidence relations on economic systems, extending traditional models with topological and influence-based perspectives.
Findings
Confidence relations affect economic variables like prices and profits.
Large influence functions can create wormholes leading to capital loss.
Political economy can produce binary and multiply connected topological structures.
Abstract
Using the similar formulas of the preference relation and the utility function, we propose the confidence relations and the corresponding influence functions that represent various interacting strengths of different families, cliques and systems of organization. Since they can affect products, profit and prices, etc., in an economic system, and are usually independent of economic results, therefore, the system can produce a multiply connected topological economics. If the political economy is an economy chaperoned polity, it will produce consequentially a binary economy. When the changes of the product and the influence are independent one another, they may be a node or saddle point. When the influence function large enough achieves a certain threshold value, it will form a wormhole with loss of capital. Various powers produce usually the economic wormhole and various corruptions.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Game Theory and Applications
