A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation

TL;DR

This paper introduces a general framework for coalition formation using merge and split rules, providing conditions for unique stable partitions across various game types.

Contribution

It offers a unified abstract method for coalition formation applicable to multiple game models, with conditions ensuring convergence to stable partitions.

Findings

Conditions for unique partitions under merge and split rules

Applicability to TU-games, hedonic games, and exchange economy games

Framework ensures convergence to stable coalition structures

Abstract

We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games.