Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Matjaz Perc, Attila Szolnoki

TL;DR
This study investigates how social diversity, modeled through various distributions including power-law, influences cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, highlighting the role of social hierarchy and spatial correlation in promoting cooperative behavior.
Contribution
It introduces a model incorporating extrinsic social factors affecting payoffs, demonstrating that power-law social diversity best promotes cooperation and that spatial correlation impacts cooperative clusters.
Findings
Power-law social diversity enhances cooperation.
High-ranking players form cooperative clusters.
Spatial correlation reduces cooperation levels.
Abstract
The diversity in wealth and social status is present not only among humans, but throughout the animal world. We account for this observation by generating random variables that determ ine the social diversity of players engaging in the prisoner's dilemma game. Here the term social diversity is used to address extrinsic factors that determine the mapping of game pay offs to individual fitness. These factors may increase or decrease the fitness of a player depending on its location on the spatial grid. We consider different distributions of extrin sic factors that determine the social diversity of players, and find that the power-law distribution enables the best promotion of cooperation. The facilitation of the cooperative str ategy relies mostly on the inhomogeneous social state of players, resulting in the formation of cooperative clusters which are ruled by socially high-ranking…
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