For-profit mediators in sponsored search advertising
Sudhir Kumar Singh, Vwani P. Roychowdhury, Himawan Gunadhi, Behnam A., Rezaei

TL;DR
This paper studies for-profit mediators in sponsored search auctions, showing they can improve advertiser payoffs, generate revenue for mediators, and coexist with direct participants, revealing complex economic interactions.
Contribution
It introduces a game-theoretic model of incentive-driven, for-profit mediators in sponsored search auctions, highlighting their potential benefits and strategic advantages.
Findings
Advertisers can improve payoffs using mediators.
Mediators can profit by managing advertiser bids.
The model shows coexistence of mediators and direct bidders.
Abstract
A mediator is a well-known construct in game theory, and is an entity that plays on behalf of some of the agents who choose to use its services, while the rest of the agents participate in the game directly. We initiate a game theoretic study of sponsored search auctions, such as those used by Google and Yahoo!, involving {\em incentive driven} mediators. We refer to such mediators as {\em for-profit} mediators, so as to distinguish them from mediators introduced in prior work, who have no monetary incentives, and are driven by the altruistic goal of implementing certain desired outcomes. We show that in our model, (i) players/advertisers can improve their payoffs by choosing to use the services of the mediator, compared to directly participating in the auction; (ii) the mediator can obtain monetary benefit by managing the advertising burden of its group of advertisers; and (iii) the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Digital Platforms and Economics
