Effects of payoff functions and preference distributions in an adaptive population
H. M. Yang, Y. S. Ting, and K. Y. Michael Wong

TL;DR
This paper investigates how initial preferences and payoff functions influence the dynamics and volatility in adaptive populations modeled by the Minority Game, revealing phase transitions and bifurcations depending on these factors.
Contribution
It introduces a detailed analysis of the effects of payoff functions and preference distributions on population dynamics, highlighting phase transitions in linear payoffs and basin boundaries in quadratic payoffs.
Findings
Diversity in initial preferences affects volatility and collective behavior.
Linear payoffs exhibit dynamical phase transitions with decreasing diversity.
Quadratic payoffs show basin boundaries separating different dynamical regimes.
Abstract
Adaptive populations such as those in financial markets and distributed control can be modeled by the Minority Game. We consider how their dynamics depends on the agents' initial preferences of strategies, when the agents use linear or quadratic payoff functions to evaluate their strategies. We find that the fluctuations of the population making certain decisions (the volatility) depends on the diversity of the distribution of the initial preferences of strategies. When the diversity decreases, more agents tend to adapt their strategies together. In systems with linear payoffs, this results in dynamical transitions from vanishing volatility to a non-vanishing one. For low signal dimensions, the dynamical transitions for the different signals do not take place at the same critical diversity. Rather, a cascade of dynamical transitions takes place when the diversity is reduced. In…
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