Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
Krzysztof R. Apt
TL;DR
This paper offers an epistemic framework for analyzing strategic games with arbitrary strategies, utilizing transfinite iterations and Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem to unify rationalizability and elimination of dominated strategies.
Contribution
It introduces a novel epistemic analysis method for arbitrary strategic games using transfinite iterations and fixpoint theory, extending previous finite approaches.
Findings
Unified framework for rationalizability and elimination of dominated strategies
Application of transfinite iterations in game analysis
Use of Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem for epistemic characterization
Abstract
We provide here an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on the possibility correspondences. Such an analysis calls for the use of transfinite iterations of the corresponding operators. Our approach is based on Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem and applies both to the notions of rationalizability and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems