Rent seeking games with tax evasion
O.Bundau, M.Neamtu, D.Opris

TL;DR
This paper analyzes static and dynamic Cournot duopoly models incorporating tax evasion, examining how time delays affect stability and lead to bifurcations, providing insights into strategic interactions under tax evasion.
Contribution
It introduces a dynamic model with time delay in Cournot duopoly with tax evasion and studies the stability and bifurcation behavior.
Findings
Identification of a critical delay value causing Hopf bifurcation
Analysis of local stability of the stationary state
Insights into the impact of time delay on tax evasion dynamics
Abstract
We consider the static and dynamic models of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion. In the dynamic model we introduce the time delay and we analyze the local stability of the stationary state. There is a critical value of the delay when the Hopf bifurcation occurs.
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Taxonomy
TopicsTaxation and Compliance Studies · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Merger and Competition Analysis
