Evolutionary Dilemmas in a Social Network
L. Luthi, E. Pestelacci, M. Tomassini

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that cooperation can be sustained in social networks through evolutionary game dynamics, contrasting with unstructured populations, and shows stability against defection.
Contribution
It introduces a simulation of evolutionary games on real social networks and reveals high cooperation levels and stability against defectors.
Findings
High cooperation levels achieved in social networks
Cooperation remains stable against invasion by defectors
Contrasts with unstructured population dynamics
Abstract
We simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what happens in unstructured mixing populations. Moreover, we empirically show that cooperation in this network is stable with respect to invasion by defectors.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques
