Sequential mechanism design
Krzysztof R. Apt, Arantza Est\'evez-Fern\'andez
TL;DR
This paper explores the sequential VCG mechanism, revealing the existence of alternative dominant strategies and demonstrating how this can be utilized to minimize taxes in public project scenarios.
Contribution
It introduces the analysis of dominant strategies in the sequential VCG mechanism and shows practical applications for tax minimization.
Findings
Existence of multiple dominant strategies in sequential VCG
Potential for tax minimization using these strategies
Illustrative examples with Clarke tax and public projects
Abstract
In the customary VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In this paper we study the sequential VCG mechanism and show that other dominant strategies may then exist. We illustrate how this fact can be used to minimize taxes using examples concerned with Clarke tax and public projects.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Optimization and Search Problems