The Copenhagen interpretation, and pragmatism

TL;DR

This paper examines the influence of pragmatism and empiricism on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, clarifying historical misconceptions and proposing an empiricist view of Bell inequality violations as due to complementarity rather than nonlocality.

Contribution

It clarifies the historical application of the correspondence principle by Bohr and Heisenberg and advocates an empiricist pragmatism to interpret Bell inequality violations.

Findings

Bohr's classical attitude led to inconsistent use of the correspondence principle.

Empiricist pragmatism explains Bell inequality violations through complementarity.

Violations are due to mutual disturbance in measurements, not nonlocal influences.

Abstract

In the past both instrumentalism and empiricism have inspired certain pragmatic elements into the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The relation of such pragmatisms with the correspondence principle is discussed. It is argued that neither Bohr nor Heisenberg did take `correspondence' in one of these forms, and that it, in particular, was Bohr's classical attitude which caused him to apply in an inconsistent way his correspondence principle to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, thus causing much confusion. It is demonstrated that an empiricist pragmatism is conducive to an explanation of violation of the Bell inequalities as a consequence of `complementarity' in the sense of `mutual disturbance in a joint nonideal measurement of incompatible observables' rather than as being caused by `nonlocal influences'.